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In our paper, we discuss reorganization from two points of view: its purpose and the choice between 
reorganization  and  liquidation,  by  reviewing  the  existing  literature.  After  setting  an  appropriate 
theoretical base for interpretation, we focus on comparing Romania‟s situation on reorganization with the 
situation in other EU countries from Eastern Europe. We find that the low reorganization rates in Romania 
are mirrored in most of the other countries, as well. Moreover, the fact that Romania has legal provisions 
inspired by international best practices can be considered a big plus. 
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1. Introduction 
Although Romania has a high insolvency rate
475, the number of companies in financial distress 
that choose to reorganize in the insolvency procedure is very small. And because one cannot talk 
in comparing terms such as big or small unless there is a subject of comparison, we chose to look 
at the Romanian insolvency rates, and specifically the rates of r eorganization, in a regional 
context. The countries we chose for our study (Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia) are part of Eastern Europe
476. We had in mind the similar geopolitical 
context of the countries in this region. A notable absence from this set of countries is Bulgaria. It 
is  missing  because  it  seems  that  no  reorganization  rates  are  published  for  this  country. 
Consequently, we would have no use of including Bulgaria as well. A second criterion for 
choosing this particular set of countries was whether they are part of the European Union as 
Romania is. The reason for this is the partially harmonized legal framework that the EU 
―imposes‖ on member countries.  
Our  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  first  two  parts  are  theoretical  discussions  on 
reorganization from two points of view: the purpose of reorganization procedures and the choice 
between reorganization and liquidation in insolvency. We aim to set the appropriate base of 
interpretation for the analysis that follows in the next part. This last part focuses on comparing 
Romania‘s situation on reorganization with the situation in the selected countries. In order to do 
this, we started out by shortly describing the laws governing insolvency in these countries and 
then moved on to analyzing a set of data on reorganization rates. Valuable sources of information 
for this paper were the Coface statistics and country reports from 2006, 2007 and 2008. 
                                                       
475  Estimated  to  1.3%  for  2008,  and  calculated  to  1.1%  for  2007,  according  to  Coface  studies  cited  in  the 
bibliography.  
476  According  to  the  United  Nations  Group  of  Experts  on  Geographical  Names  on 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/ungegndivisions.htm#ecsee.  1050 
 
 
2. The purpose of reorganization procedures 
Following  principles  set  out  by  the  World  Bank  and  indications  coming  from  the  European 
Union
477, European countries made serious steps towards adjusting their insolvency laws to what 
could become a common model (Brouwer, 2006). Principle number eight of the principles for 
effective insolvency promoted by the World Bank states that an insolvency law should provide 
both for efficient liquidation of nonviable businesses and those where liquidation is likely to 
produce a greater return to creditors, and for rehabilitation of viable businesses.  Guidelines are 
offered as to what is meant by the terms used in stating this principle
478, and a distinction is made 
between the strict, traditional meaning of liquidation and rehabilitation and the way in which 
different situations encountered in practice n owadays are entitled to altering the traditional 
meaning of these concepts. Consequently, the World Bank militates for a rescue regime  – no 
matter what name this regime takes -, that would ―permit a result that would achieve more than if 
the  corporation  was  liquidated‖.  Many  insolvency  regimes  around  the  world  suffered  major 
changes  in  the  last  years  in  order  to  comply  with  this  view,  changes  that  materialized  into 
reorganization procedures. 
Reorganization  or restructuring  is  aimed  at  finding  a  method  of rescuing  the company  from 
financial distress and salvaging all or parts of it for the benefit of all claimants. Typically, it 
involves a process of negotiation between debtors and creditors with a view to establishing a new 
mechanism for the settlement of claims that may differ from the absolute priority rule. (Hashi, 
1997)  This,  in  fact,  means  rewriting  of  debt  contracts  of  different  groups  of  claimants  and 
creditors (Hashi, 1997), reorganizing activity in the company, selling part of it, disposing of 
unprofitable activities, closing down of subsidies, reducing the scale of production activities, 
partial  lay-offs  and  so  on.  Reorganization  means  recontracting  (Franks  et  al,  1996), 
recapitalization (Roe, 1983) which leads to deviations from the absolute priority rule. (Franks et 
al, 1996) It implies extended negotiations. The nature of a formal reorganization process affects 
the out-of-court resolution of financial distress. Private arrangements have evolved to avoid some 
of the costs of formal reorganizations. 
Moulton and Thomas (1993) define successful reorganizations as ―firms which maintained their 
corporate identities, continued as publicly traded firms on national stock exchanges, and had 
postreorganization assets of more than 50 percent of prebankruptcy levels‖. In their view, to 
which we subscribe, if a new successor company can be clearly identified, even if a liquidation of 
the initial company is involved, it still classifies as reorganization.  
 
3. Choosing between reorganization and liquidation 
As we have seen in the previous part of this paper, companies facing financial distress now have 
to  make  a  choice:  liquidation  or  reorganization
479. Hashi (1997) opinionates that if financial 
markets and the acquisition mechanisms were to function efficiently and t ransparently, there 
would be no need for a supplementary insolvency procedure. The value of any company, 
including those in financial distress or bankrupt, would be known on the market. For the right 
price any company would find a buyer. However, the absen ce of completely efficient financial 
                                                       
477 We agree with a remark that La Porta et al (1998) made: ―Laws in different countries are typically not written from 
scratch, but rather transplanted from a few legal families or traditions‖. The American insolvency model seems to 
pervade most of the world‘s insolvency systems. 
478 ―In its strict sense, liquidation refers to immediate or early cessation of a business, the sale of the business or its 
productive units or the piecemeal sale of its assets. In contrast, a strict view of rehabilitation refers to the restructuring 
of a corporation that can be restored to productivity and become competitive‖ (World Bank, 2001) 
479 For most countries, these two procedures are the ones that constitute the insolvency procedure. However, there are 
variations  from  this  structure.  As  an  example,  see  the  UK  Insolvency  Law  which  provides  three  procedures  for 
companies in  financial difficulty: receivership, administration and company  voluntary arrangement (Stigma study, 
2002) 1051 
 
markets, together with the informational asymmetry between insiders and outsiders calls for a 
special mechanism to supplement existing property laws – the insolvency law. 
―Reorganization has supplanted liquidation as the normal consequence of the failure of large 
corporations. It is offered as an alternative to the sacrifice of going concern values which usually 
far exceed liquidation values. Reorganization must offer equivalent opportunity for realization of 
creditors‘ rights and expectations of priority – yet the attempt to insist on strict enforcement of 
priorities usually interferes with the conservation of going concern values.‖ The reorganization 
implied here presupposes shrinkage, at least in present realizable values, below the aggregate of 
creditors‘ claims. Every reorganization plan is itself a launching of a new financial structure to 
carry the expectations of investors. (Foster, 1935) 
Insiders  are  highly  motivated  to  prefer  reorganization  instead  of  liquidation  and  a  strict 
application of priority rule. This is the case because reorganization means recontracting, with less 
regard to the absolute priority rule. Often, for creditors, reorganization implies loss of share 
(Franken, 2003). Negotiations for recontracting give the debtor power and a position that could 
be used for the debtor‘s advantage at the creditor‘s expense (Hashi, 1997). Besides such selfish 
reasons, there are other considerations which encourage companies to opt for reorganization: the 
chance  to  reduce  the  loss  caused  to  creditors,  protecting  jobs,  maintaining  productivity,  or 
receiving government subsidy. Moreover, the fact that reorganization is an option means that 
very  risky  investment  decisions  taken  by  a  hasty  management  under  pressure  of  financial 
difficulties are less likely (Hashi, 1997).  
 
4. Eastern European reorganization rates – analyzing the data 
In order to compare Romania‘s situation on reorganization with the situation in the selected 
countries, we shortly describe the laws governing insolvency in these countries and then move on 
to analyzing a set of data on reorganization rates. 
The Czech Republic replaced the old Insolvency Act at the beginning of 2008. From this date on, 
insolvent companies have access to two types of procedures: bankruptcy and restructuring. The 
form  of  the  last  type  of  procedure  is  new  for  the  Czech  Republic.  It  allows  for  business 
continuance under creditors‘ control so that debts could be repaid in a gradual manner. Since our 
paper uses data collected in 2006 and 2007, it is useful to mention the design of the old Czech 
Insolvency Act, as well. According to an OECD Economic Survey of the Czech Republic from 
2004, the then bankruptcy legislation had some serious weaknesses: debtors were in the position 
of asset-stripping without being held responsible, the legal proceedings were long and time-
consuming, and reorganization prospects were bleak. 
The  Hungarian  insolvency  system  allows  for  a settlement  with creditors  (called  ―bankruptcy 
proceeding‖  interestingly  enough),  for  reorganization  or  liquidation  for  insolvent  companies 
(―business reorganization proceedings‖) and for voluntary liquidation. Specialists have signaled 
serious flaws (such as creditors not being sufficiently represented or time-consuming procedures) 
that reflect in insolvency rates in this country.  
As part of the European Union, Slovakia has adjusted its insolvency system according to EC 
Regulation  no  1346/2000  on  insolvency  proceedings.  Liquidation  and  reorganization  are  the 
options provided. Unlike in other systems, a debtor who has been classified as bankrupt may 
continue business activities until a court decision against such behaviour is requested by the 
trustee  on  behalf  of  the  creditors.  Reorganization  must  be  approved  by  the  court  under  the 
legitimate assumption that creditors will receive a larger settlement than in bankruptcy. 
In Slovenia, forced settlement allows the insolvent debtor to submit a reorganization proposal to 
the  court.  The  proposal  focuses  mostly  on  extending  payment  terms  and  will  be  subject  to 
creditors‘ voting. Bankruptcy proceedings are carried out by a court-appointed administrator and 
involve liquidation of the debtor. Also, there are legal provisions for forced liquidation initiated 
for ―technical‖ reasons (e.g. unregistered documents or forms). 1052 
 
The Romanian insolvency law: Law no 85/2006 replaced law no 65/1994. Unlike the old law, 
Law  no  85/2006  has  provisions  regarding  two  forms  of  insolvency  procedure:  the  general 
procedure and the simplified procedure. The general procedure means that, after an observation 
period,  the  debtor  may  enter  reorganization  and  then  bankruptcy,  or  separately,  only 
reorganization or only bankruptcy. According to Tandareanu (2006), the new insolvency law 
increases the number of cases in which a company cannot reorganize. It is desired that Law 
85/2006 be a big step forward for increasing the efficiency of the insolvency procedure, assuring 
a balance of rescuing opportunities of insolvent companies and a controlled exit of nonviable 
debtors (Munteanu & Mihai, 2006). Under the auspices of the old law, reorganization has been 
used as a way of prolonging the life of the debtors. Law no 85/2006 aims at increasing the 
efficiency  of  the reorganization  procedure, eliminating  abusive  invoking  of  reorganization in 
order to delay the exit moment by expediting the procedure and plan proposal (the plans are to be 
discussed, analyzed and compared in one creditors‘ assembly meeting), imposing discussions 
between debtor and creditors and improving creditor voting system. 
 






rate  first  half 
2007(%) 
Reorganization 




Republic  0,16  0,68  0,31  0,00 
   Hungary  0,23  0,20  0,28  0,18 
   Poland  16,67  15,66  19,05  15,98 
   Romania  33,85  0,70  .0,68  0,16 
   Slovakia  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
   Slovenia  12,65  11,25  10,94  12,65 
East 
European 
mean     10,59  4,75  5,21  4,83 
Standard 
deviation     13,49  6,89  8,00  7,42 
Table 1: Reorganization rates in Eastern Europe (calculated based on data from Coface studies) 
 
Indeed,  figures  show  that  Romania  has  a  low  reorganization  rate  defined  as  number  of 
reorganizations in total number of insolvencies, both opened strictly in the considered period of 
time. This is mostly the case for years following 2006, when the new insolvency law came into 
act (2007 shows a 0,70% reorganization rate, while in the first half of 2008 this is 0,16%). A 
33,85% rate of reorganization in 2006 and a 33,15% drop in 2007 compared to 2006 proves that 
the reorganization option was used abusively under the old law to tergiversate the insolvency 
procedure. One of the striking facts that table 1 reveals is that after the new Insolvency Act came 
into effect on January 2008, no reorganizations were initiated in the Czech Republic. Poland has 
a high reorganization rate, but a low insolvency rate which means that debtors are encouraged to 
reorganize or that they really deserve to be kept as going concerns. In 2007, figures put Romania 
above Hungary and the Czech Republic, while in the first half of 2008, the order changes a bit. 
Compared to the East European reorganization rate mean, in 2007 and 2008 Romania is well 
under this value (e.g. 0,70% compared to the mean on 4,75% in 2007, or 0,16% compared to 
4,83% in the first half of 2008). However, the standard deviation is also quite high. A high 
standard deviation implies that the reorganization rates in these countries are scattered away from 




All in all, besides showing a low reorganization rate, figures also show that Romania does not 
make  a  distinctive  note  from  the  other  countries  in  the  Eastern  European  region.  All 
reorganization rates are under 20% and most of them are under 1%. Also, there are countries such 
as Slovakia that, though having provisions for reorganization in insolvency, have no initiated 
reorganizations (at least not in the years studied). Though it has its drawbacks, the changing of 
the insolvency law in 2006 was beneficial, at least  from the point of view of the economic 
efficiency  an  insolvency  law  must  bring  to  the  marketplace.  The  mere  fact  that  the  legal 
provisions  regarding  insolvency,  and  reorganization  especially,  are  in  accordance  with  the 
world‘s best practices on the matter place Romania ahead of other countries in the region (such as 
Hungary) that are reluctant to make changes in this area. 
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